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Consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output q1. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes q1 and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p = 100 - q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals q1 +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of q1 and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses q1 first and firm 2 observes q1 and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-? 1 and ? 2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of q1 would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of q1? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f > 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q1, denoted by q1b, as a function of f. next, derive the expression for firm 1

Grant, inc., acquired 30% of south co.’s voting stock for $200,000 on january 2, year 1, and did not elect the fair value option. the price equaled the carrying amount and the fair value of the interest purchased in south’s net assets. grant’s 30% interest in south gave grant the ability to exercise significant influence over south’s operating and financial policies. during year 1, south earned $80,000 and paid dividends of $50,000. south reported earnings of $100,000 for the 6 months ended june 30, year 2, and $200,000 for the year ended december 31, year 2. on july 1, year 2, grant sold half of its stock in south for $150,000 cash. south paid dividends of $60,000 on october 1, year 2. before income taxes, what amount should grant include in its year 1 income statement as a result of the investment?

Which two of the following are benefits of consumer programs