Edna is partnering with a local grocery store to provide recipes for families on a budget. She plans to lead her audience through the process of making freezer-ready lasagna in her first presentation. Which form of informational speech would enable Edna to achieve her goal

The production manager of rordan corporation has submitted the following quarterly production forecast for the upcoming fiscal year: 1st quarter 2nd quarter 3rd quarter 4th quarter units to be produced 10,800 8,500 7,100 11,200 each unit requires 0.25 direct labor-hours, and direct laborers are paid $20.00 per hour. required: 1. prepare the company’s direct labor budget for the upcoming fiscal year. assume that the direct labor workforce is adjusted each quarter to match the number of hours required to produce the forecasted number of units produced. 2. prepare the company’s direct labor budget for the upcoming fiscal year, assuming that the direct labor workforce is not adjusted each quarter. instead, assume that the company’s direct labor workforce consists of permanent employees who are guaranteed to be paid for at least 2,500 hours of work each quarter. if the number of required direct labor-hours is less than this number, the workers are paid for 2,500 hours anyway. any hours worked in excess of 2,500 hours in a quarter are paid at the rate of 1.5 times the normal hourly rate for direct labor.

Which of the following is a competitive benefit experienced by the first mover firm in an industry? a. the first mover will be able to achieve a less steep learning curve. b. the first mover will be able to reduce the switching costs. c. the first mover will not have to patent its products or technology. d. the first mover will be able to reduce costs through economies of scale.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?