The process of negotiating labor contracts is called

Q3. loral corporation manufactures parts for an aircraft company. it uses a computerized numerical controlled (cnc) machining center to produce a specific part that has a design (nominal) target of 1.275 inches with tolerances of ± 0.020 inch. the cnc process that manufactures these parts has a mean of 1.285 inches and a standard deviation of 0.005 inch. compute the process capability ratio and process capability index, and comment on the overall capability of the process to meet the design specifications.

Colorado rocky cookie company offers credit terms to its customers. at the end of 2018, accounts receivable totaled $715,000. the allowance method is used to account for uncollectible accounts. the allowance for uncollectible accounts had a credit balance of $50,000 at the beginning of 2018 and $30,000 in receivables were written off during the year as uncollectible. also, $3,000 in cash was received in december from a customer whose account previously had been written off. the company estimates bad debts by applying a percentage of 15% to accounts receivable at the end of the year. 1. prepare journal entries to record the write-off of receivables, the collection of $3,000 for previously written off receivables, and the year-end adjusting entry for bad debt expense.2. how would accounts receivable be shown in the 2018 year-end balance sheet?

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?