Molly hue apparels inc. (mha) had been outsourcing its production to less-developed countries in order to reduce its cost of production. with the emergence of its competitor, hova inc., mha lost its competitive advantage. hova had its production units in its home country that allowed the company to bring out the latest trends to the market earlier than mha. also, mha frequently suffered due to political instability and lack of intellectual property laws in the outsourced countries. thus, parts of mha's strategies became obsolete and it had to relocate its production. what are such obsolete strategies referred to as in the planned emergence model?

Palmer frosted flakes company offers its customers a pottery cereal bowl if they send in 3 boxtops from palmer frosted flakes boxes and $1. the company estimates that 60% of the boxtops will be redeemed. in 2012, the company sold 675,000 boxes of frosted flakes and customers redeemed 330,000 boxtops receiving 110,000 bowls. if the bowls cost palmer company $3 each, how much liability for outstanding premiums should be recorded at the end of 2012?

At the save the fish nonprofit organization, jenna is responsible for authorizing outgoing payments, rob takes care of recording the payments in the organization's computerized accounting system, and shannon reconciles the organization's bank statements each month. this internal accounting control is best known as a(n) a. distribution process. b. segregation of duties c. specialized budget d. annotated financial process

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?