Theodore sorensen's memorandum
two big questions must be answered, and in conjunction with each other:

which military action, if any:
limited air strike: rusk, probably ball and johnson, acheson originally
fuller air strike: mcnamara and taylor (who convinced acheson) bohlen's 2nd choice
blockade: bohlen, thompson, probably martin, probably mcnamara and taylor 2nd choice
should political action -in particular a letter of warning to khrushchev- precede military action?
if blockade or invasion, everyone says yes
if air strike −
yes: bohlen, thompson (also k. o'donnell)
no: taylor, mcnamara, presumably acheson
undecided: rusk these questions could be focused upon by considering either the rusk or the bohlen approaches.
also ask pentagon to develop:

extent to which military problems are increased by the advance warning a note to khrushchev would touch off
hard necessity of follow-up sortie to initial "surgical" attack
possibilities of commando-type raid by parachute or helicopter
what does this passage tell you about the likelihood of military action against cuba, in spite of the risks?

no one in the group thought military action was a good idea.

it was being seriously considered by many in the group.

military action was being considered but was unlikely.