Explanation:
In the Middle East it is not always easy to distinguish who is your ally and who is your rival. They are not consistent blocks, but informal and moldable alliances depending on the theme. In addition, in a matter of days, an alignment change can occur with a domino effect on the complex web of alliances and counter-alliances that are woven in this region. The United States does not escape this dynamic. Although it is an external actor, it is a power in the Middle East and therefore participates fully in these alliance dances. And what has happened in recent years is a crisis of mutual trust. Washington has perceived the allies as a source of instability and they are beginning to doubt that they have the security guarantees that have sustained this alliance.
To try to calm things down, Obama ends his term with pledges of renewed military aid to Egypt, Israel and the Gulf countries. But you also have to listen to how media related to Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan accuse the United States of disloyalty during the coup attempt on July 15, 2016, or see how Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has exhibited a defiant attitude (all You will remember his speech in Congress on March 3, 2015 in which, allied with the Republicans, he criticized the negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program). All this while various traditional allies have struggled to build bridges to Moscow and Beijing, either to diversify alliances or as a warning sign. Arguably, a good part of the region's leaders are eager to see Obama outside the Oval Office.
It is common to hear members of the Republican Party say that Obama is leaving a more unstable Middle East with fewer friends. But assuming that the responsibility resides, fundamentally, in the decisions made from the White House during the last eight years is a biased and partial view. There is broad consensus around the idea that the invasion of Iraq in 2003 represented the apogee but also marked the limits of US power. And also that this episode is key to understanding the spiral of sectarianism that plagues the region as well as the emergence of the organization "Islamic State" as a challenge of global scope. Nor should it be forgotten that Obama has seen his room for maneuver reduced by having to coexist, for a good part of his term, with a hostile Congress. Last, and not least, is the fact that US alliances in the region have weakened not only as a result of the orientation of US foreign policy in the region but also of the events that have occurred and the decisions that have been taken in Cairo, Riyadh, Jerusalem and Ankara.
In the same way, the North American policy of alliances during the next few years will depend not only on the presidential will but also on how the conflicts in the Middle East evolve and how the regional powers position themselves. But what is certain is that the next president of the United States will have to decide if his initial bet is to rebuild alliances and return to the status quo ante or if he chooses, as in fact the countries of the region do, to diversify and relativize them. And, above all, it will have to decide in which policy it is framed: strong involvement in the conflicts in the Middle East (understood as a vital matter for the strategic interests of the United States and as a test on its status as a global superpower) or containment and gradual disengagement that allowed it to focus on other geopolitical spaces considered more decisive or to concentrate efforts on domestic issues.
It is intuited that a Clinton victory could favor a more interventionist policy, while Trump, for whom the priority would be to reduce exposure to regional conflicts, would opt for a policy of outsourcing responsibilities. In other words, Trump's message could be that the Middle East address its problems. With one exception: Israel. On the other hand, Clinton continues to mention issues such as the rule of law and fundamental freedoms that can introduce tensions in relations with his allies. If he comes to power, he will surely qualify it conveniently, but it is likely that those who advise him will become convinced that the current levels of repression and the absence of reforms are a guarantee of greater levels of instability in the future. Instead, Trump does not hide his sympathy for strong leadership and drastic decisions. This is how he staged it in his recent meeting with Abdelfatah al-Sisi in New York and his support for the way Erdogan has handled the attempted coup.
