The dominant group in a state reinforces its ability to create consent and agreement about what is normal and appropriate through the promotion of what kinds of intense feelings

As citizens grow increasingly wary of whose interests are being represented in the public policy arena, especially in light of recent sensational scandals showing a cozy relationship between professional lobbyists and lawmakers, a crisis of confidence is engulfing many democratic societies across the european and north american continents. public perceptions of undue influence peddling, in which special interest groups exercise too much sway over government for self-serving purposes, have led to growing demands for the regulation of lobbyists and transparency of the policymaking process. the united states and canada have been struggling for decades to refine their systems of lobbyist regulation. of all the shortcomings of the north american model of lobbyist regulation – and there are many – transparency is not, for the most part, one of them. many european countries have also been experimenting with systems of lobbyist regulation. until recently, however, the european national experiments have produced very different results among themselves and in comparison with the north american counterparts. surprisingly, some of the earliest efforts to regulate lobbying occurred among new democratic countries in eastern europe rather than the more advanced industrial democracies of western europe. this observation stands in stark contrast to the north american experience, where lobbyist regulation emerged as an effort to manage a highly developed class of professional lobbyists within the strictures of long-standing democratic principles. the authors find that the answer to this anomaly lies in the fact that early european lobbyist regulations focused not on  transparency  as a means to regain public confidence in government, but on providing business interests with  access  to lawmakers as a means to bolster fledgling economies. this focus on access is quickly giving way to demands for transparency as many european governments, racked by scandal, are striving to salvage the public's trust. propelled largely by example from a reluctant european parliament and commission, which are themselves attempting to convince europe that a regional government is in its own interest, several european countries are beginning to make a transition from weak systems of lobbyist regulation, which emphasize business access, to strong systems of lobbyist regulation, which emphasize public transparency. in order to discern ‘best’ practices for achieving transparency through lobbying regulation, the authors first chart the regulatory systems of the united states and canada. that is followed by an analysis of all of the european lobbying regimes. the oft-expressed objection to this new trend toward transparency in europe – that professional lobbyists view such regulations as overly burdensome – is undercut by research on european and american lobbyists’ attitudes toward regulation, which are generally quite favorable. like everyone else, lobbyists realize that they have an image problem and that the best way to address that problem is by operating in the broad daylight of public transparency. finally, the authors offer recommendations on how to enhance transparency in policymaking, drawing from detailed comparisons of the north american and european models of lobbyist regulation.

Aunitary state is a form of state where power is concentrated and there is a single center of power that extends its actions throughout the territory of the respective state. this, through its agents and local authorities, delegates of that same central power, and in its majority; it can count on a single legislating apparatus; except for certain exceptions, which legislate for the entire country; a judicial power, which applies the current law to the entire territory of the state and within which a supreme court of justice is established, which has jurisdiction at the national level; a single executive power, that is conformed by all the governors (president, governors, mayors, etc.); and a single political constitution, which governs all the territory and to which all the authorities and inhabitants of the state are subject.a confederation (from the latin: confœderatĭo) consists of the union of states that retain their sovereignty and are governed by certain common laws. initially there was talk of "confederation" in the case of alliances, for this reason the word "confederation" is still used in non-governmental civil society institutions. for this reason, the term confederation is also used to describe any type of organization that combines the authority derived from other semi-autonomous entities. in this case, sports confederations can be cited as some examples. however, the word confederation takes much more relevance when it comes to some permanent alliance of states or some association or association of states.characteristics of a federal government system

  a) written constitution. also known as magna carta and a necessity of the democracies that form federations to regulate the principles by which the government will be governed, because if they had to act without a body of specific laws would produce confrontations.

b) territorial division. federalism is constituted by the division of powers on the geographical basis of each territory.

c) decentralization. in a federal system there is both a central government and units of government lower than the central one, each making decisions regarding the provision of certain public services in their respective geographical jurisdictions.

d) supreme court of justice. to counteract the rigidity of the written constitution, judicial action is required to interpret said constitution and necessary changes can be made.