Despite the boycott of the Djibouti peace initiative by some leading warlords in Somalia, the initiative did succeed in instituting some vital interim institutions in the south, such as the transitional parliament and government, and also brought a degree of peace. Some lessons can be learned from the Somali peace agreement.
The first lesson to be learned is that peace initiatives must address the main issue, in this case, the lack of strong institutions in the country. Most of the peace initiatives carried out since 1991 failed to address the fact that the government institutions installed at independence were too weak to meet the needs of a vast country like Somalia. Part of the problem is the lack of a clear formula for power sharing among the regions. Moreover, very few mediators realise that although the Somali militias buy their weaponry from the West through flourishing black markets in East Africa, the Somali war was not instigated by outsiders. Therefore, the solution to the conflict ought to be found by the Somalis themselves.
Second, most observers who follow the dynamics of the Somalis civil war closely seem to agree that the dual affiliation of the Somalis to Africa and the Arab world has delayed the peace process. Most Somalis believe that the solution to their problem will come from the Middle East, whereas the countries keenest to solve the Somali problem are the East African states that are members of IGAD. In fact, the majority of the Somali politicians in exile and their associated think-tanks are based in Middle Eastern capitals, Europe or North America. Very few are based in Nairobi, Addis Ababa or Djibouti.
Third, there should be a single main peace initiative that all the parties to the conflict have agreed on. In fact, the multiplicity of initiatives and their simultaneous occurrence in Somalia definitely undermined serious attempts to solve the problem. Moreover, different mediators have failed to persuade the Somalis that those who initiated these peace processes were genuine and that they understood the root causes of their problem.
Fourth, the Djibouti-brokered initiative achieved as much as it did because it involved a genuine inter-Somali dialogue. It was notable that those who attended the peace process were Somalis from all works of life. They went to Arta, Djibouti, willingly and were convinced that the war in their country had to stop. Those warlords who refused to attend the inter-Somali dialogue-Hussein Mohamed Aideed, Musa Sudi Yalahow, Mohamed Kanyare Afrah and others-seemed to have lost control of the population they claimed to represent. The fact that they did not attend seems to suggest that they were disillusioned and had no specific agenda to take to Djibouti. Importantly, the solutions suggested at the Arta peace process were provided for by the Somalis themselves and not imposed on them. Fifth, imposing new actors into old plans without consensus or a new deal risks reversing the trend of the negotiations and can derail the whole process. In Somalia, imposing the renegade warlords on the interim administration will simply mean going back to war and derail the whole peace process. The transitional institutions (a government and National Assembly composed of 245 members) that were formed are representative of all the Somalis, except the northerners. These institutions and individuals should be the base of any new deal that includes at least all the southerners. It should be emphasised that President Abdulgasim Salad Hassan, elected in Arta, Djibouti on 25 August 2000, has already won international and regional recognition, as has the Somali transitional parliament. Although this recognition has little to do with the reality of his power base within the country, it does show that the international community has not given up hopes of reviving the failed Somali State. Therefore, the ongoing peace process must focus on strengthening the transitional institutions, and activating communication among Somali clans in the south, and should try to make the renegade commanders and their militias' part of the process. Africa and the international community ought to support the interim arrangements until some political and economic foundation has been put in place. This will allow a more inclusive Somali peace agreement to be brokered again, which might include Somaliland and other small regions that abstained from the Djibouti peace process.
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