Goal Your goal is to advise the President on domestic economic policy.

Role

You are the chair of the Council of Economic Advisors (CEA)

Audience

Your audience is the President of the United States.

Situation

The president wants to meet with key members of the House and Senate leadership to discuss the upcoming budget and possible tax legislation. The President relies on you and the other two members of the CEA to advise him on both domestic and foreign economic matters. In this job, you will need to compile data on the economic performance of the economy. You will need to gather the latest numbers on Real GDP (economic growth), unemployment rate, and the average level of prices. The President is especially concerned about what is happening in the lives of middle and working classes. Use the Consumer Price Index (CPI) to gauge inflation. You will need to present information on the state of the economy and your recommendations in regards to fiscal policy.

Product, Performance and Purpose

You will create a power point presentation in order to inform the President of the latest economic data and a general assessment of the phase of the business cycle the economy is currently in. You will then make your policy recommendations to the president within the body of the power point. Standards and Criteria for Success: The presentation will be assessed on the completeness and accuracy of your data on GDP, unemployment, and inflation. The analysis of the state of the economy (phase of the business cycle) will need to be clearly supported. Your recommendations to the President on fiscal policy should flow effectively from your analysis and also be well supported and persuasive. Make sure you proofread your power point -- you don't want to appear unprofessional when advising the President on such important matters.

As citizens grow increasingly wary of whose interests are being represented in the public policy arena, especially in light of recent sensational scandals showing a cozy relationship between professional lobbyists and lawmakers, a crisis of confidence is engulfing many democratic societies across the european and north american continents. public perceptions of undue influence peddling, in which special interest groups exercise too much sway over government for self-serving purposes, have led to growing demands for the regulation of lobbyists and transparency of the policymaking process. the united states and canada have been struggling for decades to refine their systems of lobbyist regulation. of all the shortcomings of the north american model of lobbyist regulation – and there are many – transparency is not, for the most part, one of them. many european countries have also been experimenting with systems of lobbyist regulation. until recently, however, the european national experiments have produced very different results among themselves and in comparison with the north american counterparts. surprisingly, some of the earliest efforts to regulate lobbying occurred among new democratic countries in eastern europe rather than the more advanced industrial democracies of western europe. this observation stands in stark contrast to the north american experience, where lobbyist regulation emerged as an effort to manage a highly developed class of professional lobbyists within the strictures of long-standing democratic principles. the authors find that the answer to this anomaly lies in the fact that early european lobbyist regulations focused not on  transparency  as a means to regain public confidence in government, but on providing business interests with  access  to lawmakers as a means to bolster fledgling economies. this focus on access is quickly giving way to demands for transparency as many european governments, racked by scandal, are striving to salvage the public's trust. propelled largely by example from a reluctant european parliament and commission, which are themselves attempting to convince europe that a regional government is in its own interest, several european countries are beginning to make a transition from weak systems of lobbyist regulation, which emphasize business access, to strong systems of lobbyist regulation, which emphasize public transparency. in order to discern ‘best’ practices for achieving transparency through lobbying regulation, the authors first chart the regulatory systems of the united states and canada. that is followed by an analysis of all of the european lobbying regimes. the oft-expressed objection to this new trend toward transparency in europe – that professional lobbyists view such regulations as overly burdensome – is undercut by research on european and american lobbyists’ attitudes toward regulation, which are generally quite favorable. like everyone else, lobbyists realize that they have an image problem and that the best way to address that problem is by operating in the broad daylight of public transparency. finally, the authors offer recommendations on how to enhance transparency in policymaking, drawing from detailed comparisons of the north american and european models of lobbyist regulation.

The lutherans i believe. i hope this : )