Rank the phases of the product life cycle in the order that they occur. Instructions Choice 1 of 4. Growth toggle button Growth Choice 2 of 4. Launch toggle button Launch Choice 3 of 4. Decline toggle button Decline Choice 4 of 4. Maturity toggle button Maturity

You are head of the schwartz family endowment for the arts. you have decided to fund an arts school in the san francisco bay area in perpetuity. every 5 years, you will give the school $ 1 comma 000 comma 000. the first payment will occur 5 years from today. if the interest rate is 5.9 % per year, what is the present value of your gift?

Stocks a, b, and c are similar in some respects: each has an expected return of 10% and a standard deviation of 25%. stocks a and b have returns that are independent of one another; i.e., their correlation coefficient, r, equals zero. stocks a and c have returns that are negatively correlated with one another; i.e., r is less than 0. portfolio ab is a portfolio with half of its money invested in stock a and half in stock b. portfolio ac is a portfolio with half of its money invested in stock a and half invested in stock c. which of the following statements is correct? a. portfolio ab has a standard deviation that is greater than 25%.b. portfolio ac has an expected return that is less than 10%.c. portfolio ac has a standard deviation that is less than 25%.d. portfolio ab has a standard deviation that is equal to 25%.e. portfolio ac has an expected return that is greater than 25%.

1. consider a two-firm industry. firm 1 (the incumbent) chooses a level of output qı. firm 2 (the potential entrant) observes qı and then chooses its level of output q2. the demand for the product is p 100 q, where q is the total output sold by the two firms which equals qi +q2. assume that the marginal cost of each firm is zero. a) find the subgame perfect equilibrium levels of qi and q2 keeping in mind that firm 1 chooses qi first and firm 2 observes qi and chooses its q2. find the profits of the two firms-n1 and t2- in the subgame perfect equilibrium. how do these numbers differ from the cournot equilibrium? b) for what level of qi would firm 2 be deterred from entering? would a rational firm 1 have an incentive to choose this level of qi? which entry condition does this market have: blockaded, deterred, or accommodated? now suppose that firm 2 has to incur a fixed cost of entry, f> 0. c) for what values of f will entry be blockaded? d) find out the entry deterring level of q, denoted by q1', a expression for firm l's profit, when entry is deterred, as a function of f. for what values of f would firm 1 use an entry deterring strategy?